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THE INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE
DEFENSE: EXPERT AND INVESTIGATIONAL
ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Many criminal cases find the prosecution and indigent defendant
mismatched, with the indigent distinctly disadvantaged.' An indigent 2
charged with a serious crime is guaranteed court-appointed counsel
to aid in his defense, and at one time this may have been sufficient
to ensure the indigent's protection. Today, however, science, technol-
ogy, and criminological specialization pervade the criminal process.3
The state has an extensive arsenal of investigators and experts at its
disposal, but the indigent defendant lacks similar resources. Without
these additional services, the indigent is ill-equipped to meet the state's
contentions. 4
The inability of the indigent defendant to adequately develop
a defense without expert and investigative aid is inconsistent with
the espoused American fundamental of "equality before the law."5
The government need not alleviate the accused's poverty, but neither
should it allow poverty to create an imbalance in the administration
1 Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L.J. 1149-50 (1960).
2 Depending on the jurisdiction, an estimated 30% to 60% of all those charged with
crime are classified as indigents. See, eg., SPECIAL COM'N To STUDY DEsxswmt SYSTMMs,
EQUAL JUSTICE FOR TnE AccusED 80, 134-35 (1959); E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED
STATES 83 (1951); Kennedy, Judicial Administration: Fair and Equal Treatment to All
Before the Law, 28 VrrAL SPEEcHEs 706 (1962).
3 See J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES ON EVIDENCE 250.
51 (5th ed. 1965); Orfield, Expert Witnesses in Federal Criminal Procedure, 20 F.R.D. 317,
339-40 (1958). "[I]n countless suits tried every day in courts across the country, the outcome
depends largely upon the testimony of an expert witness ...." N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1969,
at 41, col. 1.
4 In one case described to the author, the state presented expert witnesses employed
by the FBI and the state bureau of investigation to identify blood samples, hair samples,
and ballistics. Police officers from five sheriffs' offices also testified for the state, as did a
pathologist and four psychiatrists. The state presented 60 witnesses in all. Since there
was no preliminary hearing it was impossible for defense counsel either to interview or to
investigate the background of all these witnesses; most of them were seen for the first
time when they were called to testify. Letter from Jack W. Floyd to the Cornell Law
Review, Nov. 10, 1969. The difficulty of preparing an adequate defense when expert and
investigational services are unavailable is suggested by the continuing requests of Legal
Aid and Defender Association offices for more such services. Letter from Lewis A. Wenzell,
Assistant to the Director of Defender Services, National Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion, Chicago, Illinois, to the Cornell Law Review, Nov. 25, 1969.
5 See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S
356, 869 (1886).
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of criminal justice.6 To reduce the influence of poverty and ensure
balance, the government should provide the indigent defendant with
the services of investigators and experts to develop, prepare, and present
his defense.
I
PRESENT STATUTORY AIDS TO INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
A. Federal Court Practice
The Federal Criminal Justice Act,7 enacted in 1964, is the first
significant grant of federal aid to indigents for obtaining experts and
investigation facilities.8 Under section (e) of the Act,9 the court may
authorize counsel, upon request, to obtain necessary services on behalf
of defendant at a cost not in excess of 300 dollars, exclusive of reason-
able expenses, for each person rendering such services. The Criminal
Justice Act has been praised for its strides in granting compensated
counsel to indigent defendants0 and has been relatively effective in
this respect.1 1 But the provisions of the Act dealing with additional
services to indigents are relatively inadequate.1
2
6 REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON PovERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
FEDE.L CRIMINAL JusricE 6 (1963) [hereinafter cited as ALLEN REPORT, after the chairman
of the committee, Francis A. Allen].
It follows that insofar as the financial status of the accused impedes vigorous and
proper challenges, it constitutes a threat to the viability of the adversarial system.
... It is also clear that a situation in which persons are required to contest a
serious accusation but are denied access to the tools of contest is offensive to fair-
ness and equity.
Id. at 11. See the rationale of the Federal Criminal Justice Act, in 1964 U.S. CODE CON-
GRESSIONAL AND ADMINIsTRATivE NEws 2996. See also Note, Right to Aid in Addition to
Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REv. 1054, 1068 (1963).
7 18 US.C. § 3006A (1964).
8 Lewin, Indigency-Informal and Formal Procedures to Provide Partisan Psychiatric
Assistance to the Poor, 52 IowA L. REv. 458, 464 (1966). See Kutak, The Criminal Justice
Act of 1964, 44 NEB. L. REv. 703, 704 (1965).
9 18 US.C. § 3006A(e) (1964):
Counsel for a defendant who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert,
or other services necessary to an adequate defense in his case may request
them .... [A]fter appropriate inquiry ... the court shall authorize counsel to
obtain the services on behalf of the defendant.. . . The compensation to be paid to
a person for such services rendered by him to a defendant ... shall not exceed
$300, exclusive of reimbursement of expenses reasonably incurred.
10 See, e.g., Kutak, supra note 8, at 703-04; Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden
Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516 (1968).
11 Since its passage in 1964, the Criminal Justice Act has provided over 300,000
indigent defendants with legal counsel. Note, supra note 10, at 516. See also Editorial,
TRIAL MAGAZINE, Aug.-Sept. 1967, at 3.
12 Lewin, supra note 8, at 471, citing Letter from Daniel J. Freed, Acting Director,
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The Act authorizes expenses only for services "necessary" to an
adequate defense' 3 and apparently distinguishes between services to
develop and present existing defenses and services needed to ascertain
whether other defenses are available.14 The latter fall outside the stat-
utory language. Furthermore, the federal courts have been unwilling
to place aid in addition to counsel on the same constitutional plane
as the right to counsel, 15 and most federal courts require that additional
services be demonstrated absolutely necessary before they will grant
a section (e) application.16 A more definite standard should be delin-
eated, comparable to the grant of counsel, that places the reasonably
necessary services of experts and investigators within the indigent
defendant's reach.
The 300-dollar limitation on the compensation available to each
Office of Criminal Justice, to the Legislative Research Center, Univ. of Michigan School of
Law, March 28, 1966:
The Department of Justice advised that in the entire country there were only 53
section (e) authorizations in the first eight months after the Act went into effect,
with a total estimated cost of 13,000 dollars. Most of these authorizations were
principally for factual investigations ....
13 Note 9 supra.
14 The court-appointed attorney for the accused must often go into the field to
question and examine individuals possibly familiar with defendant's conduct and
the crime committed, in order to learn what defenses, if any, are available. Not only is
the attorney unskilled in investigative methods, but he lacks the time to expend in
thorough investigation. For the problems that may arise when counsel attempts to act
as his own investigator, see People v. Kennedy, 20 N.Y.2d 912, 233 N.E.2d 126, 286 N.Y.S.2d
32 (1967); Fish v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 761, 160 S.E.2d 576 (1968).
15 In Christian v. United States, 398 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1968), the court declared
that, although every criminal defendant financially unable to obtain counsel is entitled
to the appointment of counsel at government expense, not every similarly situated defen-
dant is entitled to appointment of an investigator or other expert services. See also United
States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966), in which the court held that no provision of
the Criminal Justice Act authorizes a federal court to reimburse an indigent defendant's
attorney for expenses incurred in preparing litigation.
Some commentators have suggested that in many cases the assistance of an expert is
more important to effective representation than the assistance of counsel. See 1964-65
Comm. of the State Bar of Ga. on Compensated Counsel, Assistance to the Indigent
Person Charged With Crime, 2 GA. ST. B.J. 197, 202 (1965). See also SPEcIAL COMM'N TO
STUDy DEFENDER SYSTEMS, supra note 2, at 58-70. For example, an indigent charged with
breaking and entering may face conviction based solely on fingerprints left at the scene.
In such a case, although the attorney for defendant may contest the state's allegations,
only a defense fingerprint expert can establish that the prints were not defendant's.
16 E.g., Bradford v. United States, 413 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1969). In Ray v. United States,
367 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1966), a forgery case, the prosecution called handwriting and
fingerprint experts to testify on behalf of the state. Defendant was denied aid to obtain
his own experts under § (e), on the ground that the Criminal Justice Act does not provide
an indigent with any procedural rights of discovery or defenses. Since § (e) is directed
toward providing procedures by which the indigent may obtain services needed for his
defense, the court's interpretation appears incorrect. See 1964 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL
AND ADMINiSTRATIVE NEws 2996.
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expert and investigator employed by the defense17 also impairs the
Act's effectiveness. The cost of such services may exceed this figure,' 8
especially in proceedings involving extensive preparation or prolonged
litigation. 0 Although statutory aid to the indigent must be limited
by the reasonable bounds of practicality, rigid monetary limitations
may unnecessarily hamper the indigent's ability to defend. It is ironic
that additional aid is not approached with the same degree of flex-
ibility as payment of court-appointed counsel, 20 which may exceed
the stated limitations if litigation is protracted. Such an adjustment
to section (e), coupled with a liberal interpretation of its provisions,
would do much to increase the flexibility and effectiveness of its grant.
B. State Court Practice
In most states the granting of aid is discretionary with the trial
court.21 Courts in some jurisdictions refuse to exercise their discretion
on the ground that the payment of expert and investigative fees
is a matter for legislative determination.2 2 In jurisdictions in which
courts exercise their discretion, additional assistance is often seriously
considered only for capital offenses.23 Even then, requests for assis-
tance are not always granted; 24 some courts refuse defense requests
17 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1964).
38 The cost, exclusive of expenses, may run as high as $2,300. Letter from James
Cardona, Public Defender, Providence, R.I., to the Cornell Law Review, Nov. 25, 1969.
19 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1969, at 41, cols. 1-4, citing fees of from $100 to
$500 per day. Crowded court dockets, which often necessitate the expert's presence several
times before the case is actually called, increase the fees. The expert must be reimbursed
for his time even if his services are not used.
20 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1964):
The court shall, in each instance, fix the compensation and reimbursement to be
paid to the attorney . . . . [The compensation to be paid . . . shall not exceed
$500 in a case in which one or more felonies are charged, and $300 in a case in
which only misdemeanors are charged. In extraordinary circumstances, payment
in excess of the limits stated herein may be made if the district court certifies
that such payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted
representation ....
(emphasis added).
21 E.g., People v. Thomas, 1 Mith. App. 118, 134 N.W.2d 352 (1965); Annot., 18
A.L.R.3d 1074, 1091-94 (1968).
22 See, e.g., People ex rel. Connecticut v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337
(1966); People v. Thomas, 1 Mich. App. 118, 134 N.W.2d 352 (1965). "Courts have
generally refused to hold, in the absence of a statute authorizing it, that defense experts
should be paid by the state. The approach has been a passive one which leaves the parties
as before-mismatched." Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and the
Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1061, 1080 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
23 See, e.g., State v. Horton, 34 NJ. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1961). But see State v. Rush, 46
N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
24 See, e.g., People v. Konono, 41 Misc. 2d 63, 245 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (services
of a detective agency at the request of the attorney assigned to an indigent defendant charged
with a capital crime are not payable from county funds). See also People v. Fernandez,
202 Misc. 190, 109 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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for aid unless and until the prosecution calls or indicates its intention
to call experts, 25 thus precluding defendants from determining whether
possible defenses are available.
At least fourteen states have legislation providing some degree
of additional aid to the indigent for his defense preparation.2 6 Although
most of these statutes were adopted in response to the Federal Crim-
inal Justice Act, the federal principles were often modified in the
transition, making, for example, expert and other services available
only in "capital cases"27 or only to persons "accused of murder." 2
Capital cases are not the only instances in which additional aid is
needed,29 and so limiting fund allotments excludes many needy de-
fendants.30 The most efficient state statutes granting services other
than counsel are those modeled after section (e) of the Criminal Jus-
tice Act with least modification.31 But the limitations encountered
in these statutes are similar to those in the federal statute. Rigid mon-
etary restrictions, for example, frustrate the statutes' purpose when
need exceeds the statutory limit.
To meet these objections, several states have provided that the
court may fix compensation for services rendered at an amount it
deems reasonable. 32 These statutes avoid the problems of a statutory
25 See, e.g., People v. Scott, 17 Misc. 2d 184, 190 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
26 CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 730-31 (West 1966); FLA. STAT. § 932.30 (Supp. 1969); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 88, § 118-8 (1967); IOWA CODE ANN. § 775.5 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21
(Supp. 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:6 (1965); N.Y. CODE CaRM. PROC. § 808
(McKinney Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-5 (1966); Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.51
(Page Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. tit. 19, § 784 (1964); RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-17-19 (1956);
S.D. CoMPILED LAws ANN. § 28-2-8 (1969); TEX. CODE Cim. PROC. art. 26.05 (1965);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-64-1 (Supp. 1969).
Many other jurisdictions provide a court-appointed attorney with some compensation
for his out-of-pocket expenses incurred in defending an indigent defendant. See Annot.,
18 A.L.R.3d 1074, 1091 (1968).
27 E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 88, § 118-3 (1967) (counsel and expert witnesses).
28 PA. STAT. tit. 19, § 784 (1964).
29 Although the defendant accused of a capital crime presents the most pressing
case due to the possible punishment, there is no logic in withholding aid from persons
facing lesser degrees of official sanctions. The same rationale that led to granting counsel
in a broad range of cases is applicable to additional assistance. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
872 U.S. 835 (1963).
30 For restrictions other than the "capital" ones, see N.Y. CODE CIUM. P ROC. § 308
(McKinney Supp. 1969) (funds for additional assistance available only in "relatively serious
incidents'); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 23-2-3 (1969) (additional aid restricted to post-trial
proceedings).
81 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21 (Supp. 1969); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2941.51 (Page
Supp. 1968); TEx. CODE CPur. PROC. art. 26.05 (1965).
32 CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 730-31 (West 1966); FLA. STAT. § 932.80 (Supp. 1969); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-5 (1966); RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-17-19 (1956).
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maximum, but they may work to deny defendant any allotment.88
Moreover, inadequate financing may restrict the court's discretion.
At present, funds are generally insufficient to finance even the cost
of adequate representation programs.3 4 Hence, states should move not
only to enact effective additional aid legislation but should also make
specific appropriations to ensure that reasonable requests for expert
and investigative aid can be financed.8 5
'I
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
At present the indigent defendant often lacks the tools to defend
against the prosecution's contentions. When additional expert and
investigative assistance are necessary to adequate representation and
the opportunity to defend, such assistance may be constitutionally
mandated.
A. Due Process
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of aux-
iliary assistance on due process grounds, this question has been con-
sidered by several lower federal courts. In McGarty v. O'Brien,"8 the
court held that it is not a violation of due process to deny an indigent
defendant's application for expert witnesses when reports of the state's
experts are available to both prosecution and defense.37 Since the task
of experts and investigators is to procure the evidence that most strongly
33 Letter from Jack W. Floyd, supra note 4.
34 E.g., Letter from Edward J. Reichert, Executive Director of the Tri-County Legal
Services, Berlin, N.H., to the Cornell Law Review, Nov. 8, 1969. Mr. Reichert noted that
the funds appropriated by the New Hampshire legislature for indigent defendants generally
run out half-way through the fiscal year.
35 A new provision of the New Hampshire statute adopted in 1969 states:
Any defendant whose case is continued for sentence, or who receives a suspended
sentence . . . may be ordered by the court to repay the state ... all of the fees
and expenses paid on his behalf on such terms as the court may order ....
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:9 (1969). Such a provision may somewhat alleviate the
financial burden on states that provide indigents with additional defense services.
36 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951).
87 See also United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540 (Sd Cir. 1951):
The same argument that would entitle [defendant's lawyers] to psychiatric con-
sultation would entitle them to consultation with ballistic experts, chemists, en-
gineers, biologists, or any type of expert whose help in a particular case might
be relevant. We do not think the requirements of due process go so far.
Id. at 547.
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bolsters their client's position, however, it seems that defendant should
be given the opportunity to present his own evidence. 3 8
Even if due process did not require that additional assistance be
given an indigent in 1951 when O'Brien was decided, concepts of due
process change.39 "[A]s civilization progresses our ideas of fundamental
fairness necessarily enlarge themselves." 40 More recent cases emphasiz-
ing the expanded notion of "fundamental fairness" in treatment of
indigent defendants4' suggest that federal courts would favor state-
compensated experts and investigative services.4 2 Douglas v. Califor-
nia,43 although conceding that absolute equality was not required
among all defendants, emphasized that due process demands that the
concept of fair trial for indigents not be reduced to a "meaningless
38 Letter from William J. Ciolka, Public Defender of Poughkeepsie, N.Y., to the
Cornell Law Review, Nov. 6, 1969. In a murder case in which defendant was represented
by a court-appointed attorney, state police fingerprint experts testified that a latent
print lifted from the crime's scene was defendant's by demonstrating 14 points of
similarity. Defense was able to procure its own expert who proved three crucial points
of dissimilarity. An acquittal followed. Id.
39 "[W]e have never . .. restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a
given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1969) (dictum).
40 United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 560 (3d Cir. 1951) (dissent of
Biggs, C.J.). See Note, supra note 6, at 1070. This dissent in Baldi had previously pointed
out that
[t]he requirement[s] of due process . . . would not be met by the appointment of
a layman as counsel. The appointment of counsel for a deaf mute would not
constitute due process of law unless an interpreter also was available. Nor, in
our opinion, would the appointment of counsel learned in the law fulfill the
requirement of due process if that counsel required the assistance of a psy-
chiatrist in order to prepare an insane client's defense.
192 F.2d at 559.
41 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
For an explanation of the fundamental fairness doctrine of due process, see Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952). Due process of law is a constitutional guarantee
respecting personal notions of fairness "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1935).
42 In Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963), the Supreme Court nearly had an op-
portunity to review the decision in Baldi, but the state decided to re-try the case. The
Court's decision to re-examine its position after Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), suggests that it might have granted additional
services in Bush. For an indication of such an attitude, see United States v. Brodson,
241 F.2d 107, 111 (7th Cir. 1957) (dissent of Duffy, C.J.), in which the defense argued
that expert accounting assistance was necessary for effective preparation. The assistance
was denied, and the dissent argued that such denial "violates those canons of decency
and fairness to which any defendant in a criminal case is entitled under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments of the Constitution .... ." Id. at 111-12. But see Feguer v. United
States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962), in which the court stated that, although the right to
call expert witnesses was fundamental, "this right does not necessarily include the pay-
ment by the government of the expenses of witnesses." Id. at 241.
43 372 US. 353 (1963).
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ritual."44 Defendant's poverty may make his attempts at defense so
ineffective that to deny him necessary additional assistance is to deny
him the basic foundation of a fair and equitable proceeding.45 In ad-
dition, an opportunity to prepare a defense is no less essential to the
indigent defendant in many situations than is the opportunity to pre-




In Griffin v. Illinois,48 the Supreme Court considered the impact
of poverty on constitutional rights under the equal protection clause.
The Court held that a state may not deprive indigent defendants of
adequate review of alleged trial errors solely because of their inability
to pay the cost of a necessary transcript. 49 There is no "rational rela-
tionship" between an individual's ability to pay costs and his guilt
or innocence,50 and discriminations based on poverty violate equal
protection.51
44 Id. at 357. The Court stated that
[a]bsolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn and we often
sustain them.. .. But where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent
has of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional
line has been drawn between rich and poor.
Id. (emphasis by the Court, citations omitted). See also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S.
487 (1963), concerning state denial to an indigent defendant of a transcript on appeal.
The Court declared that "the State must provide the indigent defendant with means of
presenting his contentions to the appellate court which are as good as those available
to a nonindigent defendant with similar contentions." Id. at 496.
45 ALLEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 45-46. One of the assumptions of the adversary sys-
tem is that defendant's attorney will have at his disposal the essential means and elements
to conduct an effective defense. Failure to provide such services "may adversely affect the
quality of the defense made or force a decision to plead guilty to a criminal charge in
situations in which the charge might otherwise be properly contested." Id. at 46.
46 See 32 Mo. L. REv. 543, 549 (1967).
47 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
48 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See Wilcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1957).
49 "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on
the amount of money he has." 351 U.S. at 19. See, however, the dissent of Justices Burton
and Minton: "The Constitution requires the equal protection of the law, but it does not
require the States to provide equal financial means for all defendants to avail themselves
of such laws." Id. at 29.
50 Id. at 17-18. The Court in Griffin stressed the theory of a "rational relationship:"
"Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's
guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair
trial." Id.
51 Id. at 17. See also Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961), where the Supreme
Court indicated that the policy of the equal protection clause is such that "the Fourteenth
Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and its hand
extends as far to each."
1970]
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On the reasoning of Griffin and its progeny, for the states to dis-
allow necessary expert and investigative services to the indigent as
such is a prohibited discrimination between "rich" and "poor" in the
application of their laws. There is a blatant disparity in the conse-
quences of state action for rich and poor when an indigent defendant,
who would have been found innocent had he had the necessary funds
to procure expert witnesses or investigative assistance, is found guilty.52
The Griffin-Douglas doctrine, considered with respect to preparation
of an adequate defense, seems to require at least that a state provide
additional assistance at the trial level if that assistance is necessary
to presenting a defense.53
C. Effective Assistance of Counsel
The guarantee of additional services to indigent defendants may
also be premised on the sixth amendment right to the assistance of
counsel for one's defense.54 The right to counsel requires the "effective"
assistance of counsel. 55 As early as 1932 the Supreme Court asserted
that the duty to appoint counsel "is not discharged by an assignment
at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving
of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case." 5 The word
"effective" sets forth no concrete standard but rather connotes the
state of being capable of bringing about an effect; i.e., equipped and
ready for service.57 The defendant's attorney is incapable of giving
52 Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Grifin and Its Progeny, 16
STAN. L. REv. 394, 405 (1964).
53 See Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU, & T. ARNOLD, CIMINAL JUSTICE IN Ous TIME 93 (1965).
Providing this minimum assistance would not elevate the indigent defendant above others
in the states' system of criminal procedure, but would merely place him on the level
occupied by most individuals.
54 For valuable commentary on the indigent's right to counsel, see W. BEANY, TiE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1965); D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 112-
17 (1958); Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal justice, 8
DEPAUL L. REv. 213 (1958); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 1
(1962); The Right to Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MINN. L. REV. 693 (1961). Assistance of
counsel in criminal proceedings is applicable to states under the fourteenth amendment.
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Note, supra note 6; 32 Mo. L. Rv. 543 (1967).
55 "[Ithe constitutional requirement of representation at trial is one of substance,
not of form .... Due Process does not require 'errorless counsel, and not counsel judged
ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render .. . reasonably effective
assistance.'" Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 37 (9th Cir. 1962) (footnotes omitted), quot-
ing Makenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.
1961).
56 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
57 For a general notion of what is meant by "effective counsel," see Waltz, Inadequacy
of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal
Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 289 (1964); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent




effective aid unless many services available to the prosecution are
also at his disposal.56 The sixth amendment does not demand a favor-
ably conclusive defense for the indigent, but effective assistance does
require that each defense in the defendant's favor should be sought
out, efficiently prepared, and adequately presented. If the "assistance"
of the sixth amendment guarantee is emphasized in conjunction with
the necessities of effective representation, the concomitant services
of experts and investigators must be supplied."9
D. Compulsory Process
The sixth amendment further declares that the accused shall
have "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 60 Ini-
tially, compulsory process to obtain witnesses may have meant merely
the right to call directly involved laymen to the stand to testify for
the defense. But as the science of criminology has developed, the state's
contentions are increasingly founded on the testimony of skilled spe-
cialists.61 If the defense is to meet such contentions, it must frequently
call its own competent expert witnesses, who often require extensive
pretrial efforts in order to arrive at their conclusions. Furthermore,
investigators are frequently necessary to seek out lay individuals who
are competent to testify on defendant's behalf. If the defense is unable
to determine who its witnesses are, the right to call such individuals
becomes of little value.
The compulsory process clause does not guarantee the favorable
determination of possible defense contentions. In addition, there is
an admitted difference between the right to call witnesses and the
right to have the government pay for them. Expert witnesses and in-
vestigators, however, cannot be compelled to serve or testify without
compensation.6 2 If the indigent is without funds to compensate expert
witnesses, investigators needed to find lay witnesses, or experts and
investigators needed to make effective use of witnesses he has, the doc-
trine of compulsory process may be reduced to little more than the
"sterile issuance of a paper."63 Lack of funds could in reality prevent
an indigent defendant from offering a defense. Although no Supreme
Court decision has yet changed the rule to require state compensation
58 See, e.g., State v. Hancock, 164 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa 1969), where defendant was
accused of forgery but was denied services of a handwriting expert, even though the
state had given notice that its evidence consisted basically of similar expert testimony.
59 See Note, supra note 6, at 1072.
60 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
61 See note 3 supra.
62 See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1182 (1961).
63 32 Mo. L. Ry. 543, 545 (1967).
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of expert testimony or investigate evidence, People v. Watson6 4 declared
that production of compensated expert witnesses for indigents was
constitutionally fundamental.6 5 "[A]lthough the defendant is afforded
the shadow of a right to call witnesses, he is deprived of the sub-
stance." 66 It is this substance that the indigent lacks. Funds for inves-
tigation to procure witnesses, for expert preparation, and for expert
testimony must be deemed as realistically coming within the confines
of a substantive theory of compulsory process.
E. Confrontation with Witnesses
The fundamental right of the accused "to be confronted by the
witnesses against him" 67 guarantees not only the right of the accused
to hear witnesses testify against him but also the right effectively to
cross-examine them. 8 Cross-examination of lay witnesses is a valuable
tool to defendant and can often separate hearsay from knowledge,
error from truth, opinion from fact, and inference from recollection.6 9
To become sufficiently familiar with the case to prepare an effective
cross-examination, defense counsel may require investigative assis-
tance.70 Defense counsel must also be adequately prepared to examine
adverse expert witnesses. This requires some knowledge of the po-
tential subjects of expert evidence in the case. The attorney may ex-
tensively research the specialized areas of his case, but he often needs
64 26 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
65 Id. at 283, 221 N.E.2d at 648.
06 Id.
67 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V1. This right is applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
68 See United States v. Barracota, 45 F. Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
69 Cross-examination is the tool by which the attorney can correctly ascertain the
order of events, the time and place they occurred, and the attending circumstances. The
Ottawa, 70 U.S.(3 Wall.) 268, 271 (1865). See also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687
(1931):
[Cross-examination's] permissible purposes, among others, are that the witness
may be identified with his community so that independent testimony may be
sought and offered of his reputation for veracity in his own neighborhood ... ;
that the jury may interpret his testimony in the light reflected upon it by knowl-
edge of his environment . .. ; and that facts may be brought out tending to
discredit the witness by showing that his testimony in chief was untrue or
biased.
Id. at 691-92.
70 Preparation for an effective cross-examination requires full knowledge of
the case, the issues involved, and the witness's background, including his address
and occupation, his interest in the case, his prejudice, if any, his relation to the
parties and counsel, and, most particularly, all his prior statements and testimony
concerning the case. Counsel should also know whether the witness has a criminal
record, has a charge pending against him, or is involved in any pending civil
litigation ....
L. FRIEDMAN, ESSENTIALS OF CROss-EXAMINATION 16 (1968).
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expert advice. The value of cross-examination is questionable if defense
counsel is not armed with background material derived from pretrial
investigations of the surrounding circumstances and expert consulta-
tion on the technical facets of these circumstances.71 Expert assistance
and investigative preparation therefore seem necessary to preserve
"the defendant's ... right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaning-
fully to cross-examine the witnesses against him."72
III
ADEQUATE DEFENSE SERVICES FOR INDIGENTS
Extending aid to indigent defendants to cover expert and inves-
tigative services is arguably required by constitutional doctrine; cer-
tainly the practical necessities of preparing an adequate defense at
least justify such an extension.7 3 Both the constitutional and the prac-
tical justifications for additional aid to indigents, however, may be
opposed by arguments of "over-extension." But every principle of law
that is carried as far as needed creates debate: "[W]here to draw the
line . . . is the question in pretty much everything worth arguing in
the law."74
The decision to implement various forms of additional-services
aid must balance the cost to the state against the significance of the
inequality affecting the indigent defendant's constitutional rights.7 5
As the sums requested by the indigent for procuring additional ser-
vices increase, some scale of priorities will have to be established to
determine how much assistance must be made available. Several con-
siderations will be pertinent in determining the degree of aid to be
granted in a particular case. The complexity of the issues in the case
should be evaluated in conjunction with the severity of the possible
penalty, as should the likelihood of defendant's presenting a meaning-
ful defense without the aid. What the prosecution is expending on
the case and the range of expenditures made by defendants of means
71 ALLEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 12-57.
72 United States v. Wade, 388 US. 218, 227 (1967) (emphasis added).
73 This need was well formulated in a letter from Lewis A. Wenzell, supra note 4.
Responses to a questionnaire sent to all Defender Association member offices indicated that
defender offices would use experts slightly over three times as often as they now use them
were such services "readily available."
74 Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925) (Holmes, J.).
75 See W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF
KING JOHN 395-96 (1914): "In the twentieth century, as in the thirteenth, justice cannot
be had for nothing .... "
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in like cases should also be relevant in determining the indigent's
reasonable requirements for additional services. 76 Flexibility is an
asset in a system of auxiliary services, and thus no exact line should
be drawn. The most reasonable formula is to provide services and
facilities at public expense to the extent that a refusal of funds in a
particular case will work undue hardship on the defendant. The harm
to the indigent caused by a denial of aid must outweigh the economic
good to the state resulting from a refusal. If a crime is serious enough
to require court appointment of an attorney, then it is serious enough
to require provision that the appointment be effective.
The United States, which prides itself on notions of equality and
progressiveness, lags behind other countries in providing funds for
an indigent's effective defense. Great Britain provides nationwide
payment of expenses for expert witnesses and investigation.77 The
Swiss mandate that "all are equal before the law" has resulted in a
variety of services in addition to counsel being made available to all
indigents.78 The broadest programs of aid in criminal cases are those
of the Scandinavian countries: in addition to receiving a court-ap-
pointed attorney, every criminal defendant, regardless of financial
status, may make use of government laboratories, expert testimony, and
investigation at government expense.7 9 The Supreme Court should
take note of these systems and expand its own constitutional mandate
to include auxiliary aid to indigents.80
Even if directives are given by state or federal courts, effective
assistance can be provided only by adequate state legislation. An ex-
cellent model is New Hampshire's statute, which provides that inves-
76 Note, supra note 52, at 414. See also sources cited in note 8 supra.
77 See The English Legal Aid and Advice Act, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51 (1949), which
makes possible state compensation for expert witnesses and investigation acquired in
conjunction with an indigent defendant's trial preparation. The pauper selects counsel
from a list of attorneys who have volunteered their names, and the attorney is paid
85% of the recommended fee out of a legal aid fund supported by Parliamentary
appropriation. See generally Note, Proceedings in Forma Pauperis, 9 U. FLA. L. Rv.
65, 73 (1956); Note, The British Legal Aid and Advice Bill, 59 YALE L.J. 320 (1950).
78 See Jacoby, Legal Aid to the Poor, 53 HARv. L. R v. 940, 942-44 (1940); Note, supra
note 52, at 413.
79 See United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1956). See also comments
on the Scandinavian practice in J. FtANK & B. FRANK, Nor GumTY 87 (1957).
80 The plan should provide for investigatory, expert, and other services necessary
to an adequate defense. These should include not only those services and facilities
needed for an effective defense at trial but also those that are required for
effective defense participation in every phase of the process, including determina-
tions on pretrial release, competency to stand trial and disposition following
conviction.
ABA PROJECr ON MImNuM STAN ARDS rOR CIMINAL JosTicE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PRovmTiG DmxNs SERvicEs 22 (approved draft 1968).
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tigators, experts, and services necessary to an adequate defense may
be obtained in any criminal case in which counsel has been appointed.8'
Upon application, the court will authorize counsel to obtain necessary
services, but if timely procurement of services cannot await prior au-
thorization, they may still be approved by the court after they have
been obtained. 2 Court determination of reasonable compensation
protects against excessive requests for funds. The court's determina-
tion is based upon a number of objective considerations, such as
time expended, the nature of the services rendered, and the stan-
dard fees for similar services. And the maximum payment figure of
300 dollars exclusive of expenses reasonably incurred for each person
rendering services may be increased when necessary.
The New Hampshire statute provides the indigent defendant
with the tools needed to prepare and present an adequate defense.
Substantive equality is the minimal condition that must exist to main-
tain the notion of fair and equitable trials, and the availability of ex-
perts and investigative aid is fundamental to that substantive equality.
Only through comprehensive statutes such as New Hampshire's can
these premises of our adversarial system be preserved.
Craig Bowman
81 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:6 (1965).
82 The difficulties that time limitations and deadlines impose can be detrimental to
the indigent in need of additional trained services. See, e.g., Letter from William J.
Ciolka, supra note 38, noting that the defense has available neither government laboratories
nor experts but must purchase expertise on the market place. If this must be done during
the trial the defense is in difficulty, since good experts are booked well in advance.
Further, the people's experts test fresh exhibits; if the defense must wait for additional
services, the exhibits may be so old that it will be impossible to get sufficient reactions
for a classification.
